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GOALS AND PROCESSES OF DEVELOPMENT
An Integrated View

1. Development: a bird's eye view.

To divide the world into West and East, and then into North and South, trying to persuade us that there is an East-West conflict and a North-South dialogue going on, does not yield much insight and does not even stand up against a little study of the map of our world. But if we use both divisions at the same time a surprisingly fruitful division of the world emerges into four worlds of development:

Table 1. Four worlds of development

	WEST	EAST
NORTH	First world: Private capitalism OECD countries	Second world: State socialism CMEA countries
SOUTH	Third world: NIEO South America, Caribbean Africa, Arab World, West Asia, South Asia	Fourth world: Ichi-ban Japan, China, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand

In dividing the world this way some positions are made explicit:

- there is no "North" as an actor, the capitalist and the socialis parts are different and enter in different ways in relation to the Third world

- there is no "South" as an actor either; the countries in East an Southeast Asia, particularly the mini-Japans (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) are both quite rich and industrialized and enter the world more like Japan. China and other countries in this region also fit better into this picture, particularly in the slightly longer run, than in any other major grouping.

- there is no "North"-"South" conflict but certainly a major eco- nomic conflict between the world Northwest and the world South- east, and a major conflict over dependency in general between the world Northwest and the world Southwest. The idea of a North-South conflict mystifies world reality.

- there is no "East-West" conflict, but certainly a major politica conflict between the world Northwest and the world Northeast.

Thus, the world Northwest, the rich private capitalist countries, emerge as the pivot element in the conflicts: a conflic over basic economic restructuring of the world with the world Southwest, the Third world; a conflict of increasingly sharp eco- nomic competition with the world Southeast; and a conflict that m erupt in a major military confrontation with the world Northeast.

also some countries in the Third, Second and First worlds, but they hardly constitute a threat to Fouth world countries in the struggle for global economic hegemony as industrial suppliers.

These three major world conflicts, obscured by artificial East/West and North/South borderlines will continue to evolve and interact in ways that are difficult to predict, particularly as a new structural conflict around the increasing dependency of the Third world on the Fourth world is also taking shape. Just as the biggest country in the Fourth world, China, manages to liberate itself from the Second world the Third world may also increasingly manage to liberate itself from the First. The efforts of the First world to find major and reliable allies in the other world (with Second world as a "North" in order to share the burdens of a more equitable world order demanded by the "South"; with the Third world as a defense against "communism" in the concept of the "Free World"; with the Fourth world as a Trilateral in order to manage world capitalism are probably all bound to fail. In fact, the First world is probably slated to suffer economic defat in the competition with the Fourth world, to suffer political defeat in its effort to continue to manipulate the Third world and may also suffer military defeat in a confrontation with the Second world - not because the Second world has more effective destructive power, but because the First world is more vulnerable.

In the shorter run the ecomic decline of the First world (low or negative growth rates, unemployment and inflation, decreas-ing market shares) will continue, as will the economic growth of the Fourth world and the stagnation of the other two worlds - with some exceptions. The Fourth world will be protected by relatively good distribution of richness, the other three will all be headed for internal revolts because of increasingly unequal distributions as the economies get tighter - particularly in the more conservati of the First world countries.

the village market; people were their own intelligentsia; police
and military there were but the former for the outside and the lat-
ter local, not both operating at the national level.

Clearly, to the extent this is a correct picture "devel-
opment" entails an enormous concentration of power at the national
level with the goal-setting becoming a national ideology of ade-
quate standard of material living, for all; national plans and mar-
kets providing goods and services and the PMP complex pushing where
BWL and BCI provide and insufficient pull. This concentration of
power takes place in what is here called the "social" space, mean-
ing by that the country, or (wrongly) the "nation". But there are
also other space: the human (or inner, the local, the global and
the outer (nature). When there was a low level of plan and market
at the national level this does not mean there were no plans and
markets, but they were at the local level. National articulation
would generally imply local disarticulation, at least in relative
terms; although processes whereby both national and local levels
of power increase together are not inconceivable.

If we now take national plan and market articulation as
the key aspects of development of social space the four worlds
of development can be relatively well fitted in:

Figure 2. ` Development as plan and market articulation, nationally

RED
State
PLAN
Bureaucracy
Marxism
(socialism)

Second world   Fourth world

ROSE
Social democrat

YELLOW
State and Capital
PLAN and MARKET
Bureaucracy and Corp.
Japanism

GREEN
Local
HUMANS
Family, Peers, Village
Anarchism, Gandhism, Maoism

Third world   First world

BLUE
Capital
MARKET
Corporation
Liberalism
(capitalism)

more market articulation through   an expanding private sector.

This thing called "development", then, seems to be   to drag Third world countries with a very weak national level super-structure from the corner where they were, traditionally (as we wer all of us), and up to some place on that diagonal - from the Green corner to the Blue corner if they get US/First world "assistance", to the Red corner if they get SU/Second world "assistance", and towards the Rose segment in-between if they get "assistance" from such 'First and a half" countries as Yugoslavia or Norway. As all these countries are members of the United Nations it is not so easy for the UN to engage in development assistance without being a party to one world or the other; a problem often solved by sticking to funda mentals on which there is sufficient consensus (provision for ma-terial basic needs and for basic administrative infrastructure).

In short, "development" is a way in which certain coun-tries, strongly articulated at the national level, reproduce themse ves. Why they do it can be discussed (to have allies in the world space, to validate their own system, to penetrate better in somethi shaped the way they know and master, out of solidarity with the poor and repressed); whatever one's judgment it is clear that this is the only thing they can do because it is the only thing they kno how to do. There is a broad consensus that to be modern, developed one has to be somewhere on that diagonal.

A broad consensus, yes, but with three rather major ex-ceptions.

The first is found among the defectors from that line, the green wave of people disenchated with too much plan and/or mar-ket articulation, groping for systems more rooted in the local leve in family and peers, and in what is held to be true human needs. At the same time as there is an effort to push and pull Third world countries up towards some landing place on that diagonal many peopl

and three (or four - gandhism/anarchism/maoism and japanism) along
the other. Of course, practicse differs and will always have to
differ from theory - no reasonably coherent body of social thought
can ever mirror complex and contradictory social reality wothout
making a travesty of it.

And yet it is useful to think in terms of these five col-
ors or six, seven theories. There is so much human aspiration and
dream, and so much genuine endeavour to come to grips with the
human condition in general and the development problématique in
particular embedded in them! And exactly for that reason one won-
ders whether they really exclude each other or whether they are
not also expressions of social and intellectual polarization; of
one group embracing one ideology put forward by one intellectual
who is then contradicted by another intellectual putting forward
his theory (usually "his", women seem to be less interested in such
verbal games) which is then embraced by a group with interests seen
as contradictory to the first group. And so on, and so forth.

But if that is the case the search for viable combinations
might be interesting, seeing the polarization as due to the theory
process rather than as due to any deeper social process. If we
use the two axes of Figure 2, capital-articulation and state-arti-
cuation, as the two basic ideological vectors in this effort to
theorize about social space, then the ideologies or theories along
the main diagonal, from green to yellow, are already eclectic - in-
cluding the rose one. On this diagonal $S = C$; the question is how
high one wants $S + C$ to be, minimum as in the green solution, in-
between as in the rose solution, or maximum as in the yellow solu-
tion?

My own predilection would be in favor of something between
green and rose as that would yield the society with the highest le-
vel of complexity, with both local, state and capital articulation.

Let us now make this more complex by exploring more the other two types of power: normative and coercive, not only the structure built to provide for goods and services, making people comply as producers as otherwise they would not qualify as consumers. To expand a little on Marx: a basic key to power is to own means of production (not necessarily individually, but as a class, capitalis or bureaucrat or both) so that one can say: produce on our conditio or else! (starve to death), because you will not gain what you need to consume. Do ut des, quid pro quo.

But people have to want to consume that which they produce. They have to want the goods and services produced, not other goods and services; leaving alone that they should not be able to produce in any other way than that articulated by B and C and their helpes in the intelligentsia. The promulgation of BWL serves this purpose under the second point, "material comfort". There is the problem of how to produce all these material goods when non-manual work is also promissed: the contradiction presumably resolved through very high productivity and automation, at the expense of those in other worlds who still have to engage in manual work. The need for services is assured under the third and fourth points: privatism means withdrawal from the local level into a micro space that cannot possibly supply neither goods nor all the services ("love and tendercare" may be, but not medical care and schooling), Hence the local level is left in vacuo, and the national level is emerging as having a monopoly on essential services. Local economic (goods and servuces) cycles are broken up, the cycles expand and become national, spun through B and/or C. The state, not the local level and not even capital, is seen as the ultimate guarantor of security - not only in the limited sense of protection against violence, but in the sense of social security, lasting provision for basic needs, the famous security net.

But the BWL ideology is not all that is needed in terms

But few systems have this value density. In the Occi-
dent, for instance, it took long time to bend Christianity (origi-
nally a religion highly compatible with green values) so that a
good Christian would serve the state (Emperor Constantin, Roman
Empire) and/or capital (Calvin?). To ensure that one   does
what one has to do even if one does not want to do it, social con-
trol (a euphemism for force) is needed, not the carrot of products
if one produces in the prescribed manner (as slave, serf, worker),
but the stick of pain inflicted. Basic values insufficiently inter-
nalized have to be <u>institutionalized</u>. And thus the history of de-
velopment also becomes the history of coercion, force, violence:
both the coercion needed to keep a system in a certain region in
the space of development (Figure 2), the coercion needed to move
it (breaking down the structures that upheld the preceding pattern,
for instance) and the coercion needed to settle in a new region.
Each formation serves the interests of some groups more than others
and in general one would expect the overprivileged to resist and
the underprivileged to promote a change.

Is any world of development more inherently repressive
than the others? Empirical studies may certainly give correlations
between location of a country (according to Table 1) and level of
repression. But methodologically they may be difficult to inter-
pret. Is the repression a part of the formation or is it a reac-
tion to efforts to alter status quo, from within and/or without?
Or is it an effort to alter the status quo in and by itself, a for-
mation on the way to something else? The safest position to take
on this issue is probably that any system can be found with or
without high levels of repression, with or without the brown ele-
ment, so to speak. Thus, feudalism was to a large extent repres-
sion exercised over fragmented, relatively self-sufficient local
communities. The transition to capitalism presupposed some open-
ing of cycles of local self-sufficiency, forcing labor into nation-

From the position that repressive structures may be
found anywhere it does not follow that they are equally likely any-
where. A non-repressive structure is one that gives people a chance
to participate, to have not only a say but even the final word,
meaning that the authorities are ultimately accountable to the
people (to whom they are an authority). There are many ways in
which this may happen. Parliamentary, nation-wide democracy is
said to be one, constitutional guarantees for basic human rights
is also one. However, the stand taken here will be that an assem-
bly (which can be dissolved very easily) or a constitution (which
can be violated equally easily) are insufficient to stem the powers
of coercion of the PMP complex. Theirs is the state as organiza-
tion, a state that in addition organizes goods and services and
promulgates ideology. For that state not to be repressive it has
has to be balanced by something more than assemblies and words. It
has to be balanced by another structure of some solidity, and
there has even to be some built in contradiction, even antagonism
between the structures for them to balance each other in such a
way that people can get some latitude, some space in-between.

There seem to be two possibilities here; one coming out
of liberal theory but actually much more from social democratic
practise, and one coming out of federalist theory and practise.

The first is the idea of having capital balance the state.
It is a very old and very bourgeois idea, and by state is then usu-
ally meant only the PMP part, not the B&I part. But if the state
is taken in a somewhat broader sense as also implying planning and
execution for a range of goods and services, then we are in the
social democrat part of the development space. It cannot be quite
by chance that those welfare states in Northwestern Europe (and
some Commonwealth countries highly inspired by them) are both mixed
economies and quite democratic in the usual sense of that term.
Of course it works both ways: because of a democratic tradition

One might now add a third possibility: a totally green
(dark green) society where there is direct democracy in all local
units because they are sufficiently small, and that is it. But
is this a society, or just a set of local units? For it to become
a society some central element is needed, call it a national level
or whatever, and the thesis is that it is not enough that each
local level is democratic (in the sense that the authorities are
fully accountable to the people and can be recalled). The local
levels must also be able to act together, otherwise they would be
too easy prey, one by one, for central powers.

But then there is the fourth possibility, that of having
the local unit as a society in its own right! After all, the clas-
sical European state was very often a mini-state - there are still
some remnants of that system (such as Andorra, San Marino, Lichten-
stein). This would be a solution provided they do not become too
easy prey to bigger fish in the global waters. In other words, it
may only be a solution if it is not only a local but also a global
solution.

According to this way of thinking the potentially least
repressive society would be one with both balance mechanisms at
work: state balances capital, and national level in balance with
local level. One may think of Switzerland, but that is hardly cor-
rect: state and capital work too well together, and the cantons
are too fragmented. Hence, even in the country of very frequent
referenda it may be very difficult for the population to override
a center that is too well harmonized when the people are too geo-
graphically fragmented.

Again, it is along the main diagonal in development
space solutions seem to be located. The principle of balance
should be added to the principle of complexity above, again focus-
sing on the main diagonal, and particularly on the segment between
green and rose, not towards the yellow as it becomes too top heavy.

these needs that are or can be seen as more somatic, material.

But then there are the growth or development needs,
more mental/spiritual, less material although there certainly also
is a material basis for them, eg a rock, rock bottom level satisfac
tion of the material needs. Needs for identity and needs for
freedom are being needs as opposed to the having needs just men-
tioned. There is no limits to their satisfaction. From their dis-
satisfaction, in the shape of alienation and repression, respec-
tively it is not a range, like for hunger, up to a point of sati-
ation. There is a ladder which can be climbed, up from the murky
swamps of alienation and repression, into daylight - but that lad-
der just goes on and on like Jacob's ladder in the Bible, but
unlike Jacob's ladder it does not even end in Paradise, in Heaven.
There is no end. And there are many ladders, not just one. More-
over, much of the climbing one has to do oneself, neither pushing,
nor pulling are sufficient however necessary they may be in cer-
tain stages. A person can be fed and clothed and so on, but cannot
be given identity and freedom. They are aspects of the person's
personality, evolving through exertion, ever more, and then even
more. There is no limit to being, or at least they are far away,
like in Goethe's Faust (wer immer strebend sich bemüht, den können
wir erlösen) or in the buddhist vision of human growth, ending in
a state of maximum entropy, nibbana.

This is not a place to explore in any depth a theory of
identity and freedom. Had we lived in a less economistic/material,
more humanistic/spiritual era vocabularies for quick, but also
deep communuciation would have been around - but we do not. Suffic
it only to say that there are many foci with which a person can
identify: self (including work products), persons in the micro
space around oneself, the local space, the macro space (country
with its institutions, nation with its culture), the region, the

The present paper gives a brief description of some of the basic
assumptions in a world model coming out of the Goals, Processes and
Indicators of Development Project, the GPID Project. Where the prese
author is concerned that project came out of research done at the
Chair in Conflict and Peace Research at the University of Oslo inthe
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Genève, and to Dietrich Fischer in particular.

For some publications by the present author from the GPID Project,
all in one way or the other feeding into the GPID$_L$ model, see:

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"The Basic Needs Approach",(pp. 55-125) in
Lederer, K. Ed., Human Needs, A Contribution to the Current Debate
Hain, Königstein, 1980

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Compatibility, Contradiction and/or Conflict?" in
Braillard, P, ED., Annales d'études internationales, Genève 1978, 127.
also in
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"The North/South Debate: Technology, Basic Human Needs and the
New International Economic Order", (the two preceding papers + introd
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"Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace",
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Journal of Peace Research, 1980, pp. 281-290

"Structure, Culture and Intellectual Style:
An Essay Comparing Saxonic, Teutonic, Gallic and Nipponic Approaches"
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"Five Cosmologies: An Impressionistic Presentation",
Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademis Årbok 1980, pp.

Also see Essays in Peace Research, Vols. I-V, Ejlers, Copenhagen,1975
The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, The Free Press, NYC, 198
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in The New Cambridge Modern History, Companion Volume, Cambridge 1979.

megalopolis hustle-bustle. There is no perfect correlation here, and yet persons who seem to have come far along such roads, if not attaining buddhahood at least attaining what one might call "person-hood", and communicating what they have attained to others through acts of creation have done so living in the small, even sometimes isolated, in an unencumbered setting of neither too little, nor too much of material things.

How, then, does all this relate to the development exercise as we know it from social space, with its three power articulation dimensions: normative power expressed as the general goal of BWL, remunerative power expressed as the goods and services BCI can produce, and coercive power as the control, force, pain etc. that PMP can exert? The conclusions are both simple and obvious and well known, but they have to be drawn and even as often as possible. But let us first note the correspondence (not accidental) between the dimensions of power and the classes of needs: normative power defines with what to identify; remunerative power defines goods and services - certainly relevant for survival and well-being; and coercive power sets the limits to freedom.

I think there is little doubt that the strong point of the development styles seen as blue, red and yellow above is there ability, at least in the first run, to give satisfaction to the material needs for survival and (material) well-being. There is no scarcity of having for most, or at least many people in these three worlds; in fact, the system behaves as if there is, or should be, no limit to having. But as to the other two needs classes the picture is negative. Normative power is exercised so as to legitimize the BCI complex at work with its termite like production mania, demanding identification with the goals of the highly materi-alistic BWL to the exclusion of other concerns if they are at vari-ance with that goal pattern. More than that: there are also ideas or values of competition, rationality and discipline , all defined

4. Development: the world space

Let us now try the same exercise for the world space, simply asking the question: what are the consequences of the various styles of development for the world space, the space of governments (states), but also of nongovernments (international nongovernmental organizations, profit and non-profit). This is both a more easy and a more difficult exercise; easy because the consequences of this tremendous accumulation of normative, remunerative and coercive power in the hands of the ruling elites (BCI, PMP) of the states are so obvious, difficult because there is so little explicit thinking about what a developed world space would look like. In a sense this is both strange and obvious: strange because it should be so tremendously signifi'cant and also tempting as an intellectual exercise; obvious because recognition of the world as a system with possible development dimensions is recent, at any rate more recent than the recognition of the society as such a system which again is more recent than the recogni tion of human beings as systems with such dimensions - of human growth. and in the absence of thinking many people become prey to the easiest type of analysis, reductionist analysis, failing to see the sui generis nature of these spaces. Acording to such views a developed society is a set of developed human beings, and a developed world a set of developed societies. One also hears, but that would be from the commissar rather than from the yogi just referred, reducing everything to human growth: a developed human being is what comes out of a developed society - for instance a socialis society. One never hears, however, that a developed society is the product of a developed world for the very simple reason that no such concept seems to have emerged.

About a maldeveloped world, however, we know a lot. Again the three power aspects are useful. If the world should co sist of only one society then one could, of course, apply the ana

blue governments may very well cooperate and together constitute
an internal sectorwhich would then be intergovernmental (if in addi
tion it is social democrat it might include most of the participant
countries where their population is concerned).

In the world in which we live, furthermore, the general
ethos becomes dominated by the dominant ethos of the dominant
elites in the dominant countries. Conretely, this means a general
world ideology with the materialism of the bourgeois way of life
at its center, easily the most popular (in the sense of number of
adherents) ideology in human history. At the social level three
elements had to be added to this: competition, rationality and dis-
cipline. But it does not quite work like that at the world level.
Competition there certainly is, leading to military races and eco-
nomic races, to efforts to obtain military balance and economic
balance (zones of influence, quotas, rules of the game, etc.), and
when this does not succeed, ultimately to military wars and econom
wars, increasingly devastating with higher levels of military tech
logy in particular and production technology in general. In the so
cial space such phenomena, by no means unknown, could be tempered
by the combination of rationality and discipline. But in the
world space both seem to be curiously absent: the tragedy of the
commons is enacted in world space rather than in social space and
is, of course, an exercise in lack of both rationality and disci-
pline. Which all serve to prove one thing: some kind of world
central authority is necessary, commanding either, thereby regul-
ating competition among governments and nongovernments and based c
both of these as well as on the world population directly. Some-
thing between the United Nations, as we know it, and world govern-
ment of strong states as we - indeed - also know it.

So again we are led to the same conclusion: the primacy
given to the social space leads to human maldevelopment and also
world maldevelopment - to the pauperization of those in the exter